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I. Introduction
In the business world, there are devices called "vertical
restraints."' A vertical restraint is when a seller places a condition
on a buyer that regulates how the buyer can dispose of the
product.2 There are many types of vertical restraints; some of the
most common types are territorial restraints,3 tying arrangements,4

I See,

e.g.,

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:

PRINCIPLE AND

EXECUTION, 181-206 (Harvard University Press 2005).

2 See, e.g., id.
3 See, e.g., Lonnie L. Ostrom, Craig Kelly & Donald W. Jackson, Jr., Vertical
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and resale price maintenance.5 For the purposes of antitrust law,
one of the most salient divisions between types of vertical
restraints is that between vertical price restraints and vertical nonprice restraints.6 The basic arguments in favor of vertical
restraints are that they allow a manufacturer to get a dealer to
provide more services related to the goods by counteracting the
free rider effect; they promote inter-brand competition; and they
facilitate the entry of new firms into the market.7
Resale price maintenance is when a manufacturer specifies the
price at which distributors can resell goods that they purchase
from the manufacturer. The Supreme Court declared the practice
illegal per se 8 in 1911 in Dr.Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons.9 Although the practice was declared illegal per se , it has
been allowed under certain circumstances after the Dr. Miles
decision.'" In the recent case Leegin CreativeLeather Products v.
PSKS, Inc.," the Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles and declared
that the proper standard
for judging resale price maintenance was
12
the rule of reason.

This Note will discuss and analyze Leegin. Part II of this note
will set forth the facts, procedural history, and holding of Leegin.
Part III will discuss the background law. Part IV will analyze the
holding in Leegin. Part V will conclude that Leegin was correctly
decided, as the holding will make the Court's antitrust
TerritorialRestraints Rules of Legality and Guidelinesfor Channel Design, 14 J. ACAD.
MKTG. SCI. 1, 1-6 (1986) (discussing the legality of vertical territorial restraints).
4 See RICHARD POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS, 777-857 (West Pub. Co. 2d ed. 1981) (discussing "Tying

Arrangements and Related Practices"). A tying arrangement is a practice whereby a
manufacturer will only allow his product to be sold in conjunction with his other
products. See id
5 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 183.

6 See, e.g., id. at 186-90.
7 See, e.g., id. at 184-86.

8 See discussion infra Part II (discussing what it means for a practice to be illegal
per se under American antitrust law).
9 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127
S. Ct. 2705 (2007)); see discussion infra Part Il(B) (discussing the Dr. Miles case).
I0 See discussion infra Part III (discussing when and under what circumstances the
United States Supreme Court has allowed resale price maintenance).
II 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
12 Id. at 2710; see discussion infra Part Ill(A) (explaining the rule of reason).
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jurisprudence more consistent and will benefit the economy.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., (Leegin) "designs,
manufactures, and distributes leather goods and accessories." 13
Since 1991, Leegin has sold women's fashion accessories under
the brand name Brighton. 4 More than 5000 retail establishments,
mostly independent, small boutiques and specialty stores, sell
Leegin's products.15 Leegin uses smaller retail establishments to
sell its products due to the sentiment that smaller retailers "treat
customers better, provide customers more services, and make their
shopping experiences more satisfactory than do larger, often
impersonal retailers."' 16 In the words of Leegin's president Jerry
Kohl: "[W]e want the consumers to get a different experience
than they get in Sam's Club or in Wal-Mart. And you can't get
that kind of experience or support of customer service from a store
like Wal-Mart." 17
PSKS operated Kay's Kloset, a women's apparel store that
sold products from "about 75 different manufacturers," including
Brighton products. 8 Kay's Kloset engaged in various activities to
promote Brighton 9 since Brighton accounted for between forty
percent and fifty percent of their sales.2 ° In 1997, Leegin instituted
the Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy, a minimum
resale price program. 2' The purpose of the policy was to provide
sufficient margins to retailers, which would enable retailers to
engage in the types of customer services that were "central to
[Leegin's] distribution strategy," and to discourage discounting,
which Leegin felt harmed its reputation.22
13 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710.
14 Id.

15 See id
16 Id. at 2710-11.

17Id.at 2711 (citation omitted).
18 Id.

19Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.
20 Id.

21 Id. (citation omitted).
22 Id.
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In December 2002, Leegin discovered that Kay's Kloset had
been marking down Brighton's entire line by twenty percent.23
Leegin asked Kay's Kloset to stop discounting Brighton products,
but Kay's Kloset refused. 24 Because of the store's refusal to stop
discounting, Leegin stopped selling to the
retailer.2 ' As a result,
26
severely.
Kay's Kloset's profits suffered
B. ProceduralHistory
PSKS, the operator of Kay's Kloset, filed a lawsuit against
Leegin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas.27 PSKS alleged, among other claims, that Leegin had
entered into an agreement with other retailers to set a minimum
retail price, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.28 Leegin argued that it had not entered into a price fixing
agreement with retailers but had engaged in its price fixing scheme
unilaterally, which is legal under the Colgate doctrine.29 Leegin
also attempted to introduce evidence of the pro-competitive effects
of its resale price maintenance policy, but the court excluded that
evidence.3" The Court relied on the rule of Dr. Miles" and held
that resale price maintenance was per se illegal.32 The jury found
for PSKS, awarding it $1.2 million.33 After trebling the damages
and awarding attorney's fees and costs to PSKS pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 15(a), the total judgment against Leegin amounted to
$3,975,000.80. 34
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Leegin
conceded that it had entered into a minimum resale price
Id.
Id.
25 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2712.
23

24

28 Id.

Id.; see infra Part 111(B)(1) (discussing the Colgate doctrine); see also U.S. v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
30 Leegin, 1275 S. Ct. at 2712.
31 See infra Part I1l(B)(1) (discussing Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 373).
32 Leegin, 1275 S. Ct. at 2712.
29

33 Id.
34 Id.
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maintenance agreement with its retailers.35 However, Leegin
argued that minimum resale price maintenance agreements should
be judged under the rule of reason. 36 The Court held that it was
bound by Dr. Miles and subsequent Supreme Court cases to apply
the per se rule to minimum resale price maintenance agreements.37
It therefore held that the District Court correctly excluded the
evidence of the pro-competitive effects of resale price
maintenance and affirmed the District Court's judgment.38
C. Holding
After discussing the general principles of antitrust analysis, the
Court began its opinion by examining Dr. Miles.3 9 It began by
noting that the Court in Dr. Miles relied on the common law
prohibition of general restraints on alienation.4" It also noted the
Dr. Miles Court's other rationale for treating vertical price
restraints as invalid: They were analogous to a horizontal
agreement among the dealers to fix prices, which would be per se
illegal. 4 As to the first justification, the Court remarked that the
Court in Dr. Miles relied on a treatise from 1628.42 The rule was
inapposite; the rule was most closely associated with land and had
to do with personal property being removed "from the stream of
commerce for generations."43 By relying on the old common law
rule, the Dr. Miles Court had "justified its decision .
on
'formalistic' legal doctrine rather than 'demonstrable economic
effect.'"44
As to the second reason relied on by the Dr. Miles Court,
comparing vertical restraints to horizontal restraints, the Court
noted that its late jurisprudence had moved away from using rules

35 Id.
36 Id.

Id.
38 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2712.
37

39 Id.at 2712-14.
40 Id.at 2714.
41

Id.(citing Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 404-05).

42 Id.

43 Id.

44 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2714 (internal citations omitted).
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against horizontal restraints when dealing with vertical restraints.4 5
The later cases, according to the Court, have "appreciated
differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal
agreements, differences the Dr.Miles Court failed to consider."46
Since the Court found the reasons that the Dr. Miles Court
used to justify the per se rule against vertical minimum price
restraints inadequate, it then examined the economic effects of
vertical restraints.4 7
The Court began by noting the procompetitive effects of vertical price restraints. 48 The first benefit
that it acknowledged was that vertical price restraints could
stimulate inter-brand competition.49 Vertical restraints could do
this in two ways. The first would be by decreasing intra-brand
competition.5 ° This decrease would enable retailers to provide
more services. Absent price restraints, some retailers would be
able to "free ride," by allowing other retailers to make investments
in services, such as show rooms or knowledgeable staff, and then
sell the product for a lower price.5" As a result, those services
would be underprovided. 2 Vertical restraints could benefit the
manufacturer by allowing customers to learn about the benefits of
the product from knowledgeable staff, or by allowing customers to
buy the product from a certain store because that store has a
reputation for selling high quality merchandise.5 3 Allowing these
vertical restraints could also benefit consumers by allowing them
to choose between a high cost, high service brand; a low cost, low
54
service brand; or somewhere in between.
Additionally, the Court stated that resale price maintenance
reduces barriers to entry for new firms.55 By ensuring guaranteed
margins to retailers, a new manufacturer can convince a distributor

45 Id.
46

Id.

47 Id. at 2714-15.
48

Id. at 2715.

Id.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715.
51 Id. (citing Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977)).
52 Id.

49

50

53

Id.at 2715-16.

54 Id.at 2714.
55

Id at 2716.
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to make the investments that are often required in introducing new
and unfamiliar products to the public.56 After all, "[n]ew products
and new brands are essential to a dynamic economy, and if
markets can be penetrated by using resale price maintenance there
is a pro-competitive effect."57
The Court then went on to discuss the possible negative
consequences of vertical resale price maintenance. The Court
noted that vertical resale price maintenance could facilitate the
formation of a manufacturer cartel by helping the cartel to
discover if some manufacturers were cutting prices.58 Also, resale
price maintenance could facilitate cartels at the retailer level.59 A
group of retailers could form a cartel and force the manufacturer to
engage in resale price maintenance.6" The retailers would not use
the extra margin to provide more services, but simply to allow
inefficient members of the cartel to survive.6 ' On the other hand,
more efficient retailers would be barred by the cartel with its
artificially wide profit margins from entering into the market by
introducing price competition. 62 The court noted that horizontal
cartels are illegal per se and that price fixing vertically would
serve as evidence in such a case.63 A dominant retailer might also
be able to use resale price maintenance to keep itself from having
to innovate. 64 A manufacturer would have little choice but to go
along with the retailer if it needed access to the retailer's
distribution network. 65 Lastly, a dominant manufacturer could use
resale price maintenance to discourage retailers from selling the
products of its competitors.66
The Court then looked at some of PSKS's arguments. It
rejected the argument that administrative convenience and costs
56 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2716.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2717.
63 Id.
64 See id
65 Id.
66 Id.
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associated therewith should render resale price maintenance per se
illegal. 67 The Court felt that a per se rule would "increase the total
cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting pro-competitive conduct
that the antitrust laws should encourage. 68 The Court then
rejected the contention that resale price maintenance should be
illegal per se because it leads to higher prices.69 It rejected this
argument because price surveys do not necessarily say anything
about consumer welfare.7" It also rejected this argument on the
grounds that it had allowed other vertical restraints that tended to
increase prices, and that resale price maintenance could reduce
prices if the manufacturer switched to it from one of the other
more costly vertical restraints that the courts allow.7 ' The Court
relied on the fact that manufacturers can do a variety of things that
increase price and that are not violations of the antitrust law, such
as use higher quality materials or pay for advertising.72
The Court also suggested some factors to be used in the future
analysis of resale price maintenance agreements. It suggested that
the number of firms in an industry that engaged in the practice was
an important consideration. This is because if more firms engage
in the practice, it is more likely that the practice is being used in an
anti-competitive manner.74 They also suggested that the source of
the restraint was an important consideration, because it is more
likely being used anti-competitively if initiated by the retailer
rather than the manufacturer.75 The final guideline the Court
suggested was the market power of the firm engaged in the
practice; the more powerful the firm, the more likely that resale
76
price maintenance would be abused.
Id. at 2718.
68 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
67

69 Id.

70 ld. at 2718-19.

71 Id.; see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L. J. 135, 148 (1984) (noting that the manufacturer could assign
retailers exclusive territories for dealing, which would allow the retailers to provide more
services since there would be no other dealers nearby to free ride).
72 Leegin, 127 S.CL at 2719.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75 Id. at 2719-20.
76

See id.
at 2720.
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III. Background Law
A. The General StandardofAnalysis in Antitrust Law
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."77
The literal terms of the Sherman Act would seem to bar any
agreement between business people.78 However, "[a]lthough the
Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement 'in restraint
of trade,' [the] Court has long recognized that Congress intended
to outlaw only unreasonable restraints."79 Thus, the prevailing
standard of analysis is the so-called "rule of reason."8 Under the
rule of reason, "the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
history, nature, and effect."'"
However, certain agreements are said to be illegal per se *82
After all, "there are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."83 The
77 15 U.S.C.S § 1 (2007).

78 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898)
(observing that if the Court interpreted the Sherman Act literally, "there would scarcely
be an agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to have,
indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly restrain
it.").
79 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982)).
80 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1
(1911)).
81 Khan, 522 U.S. at 10.
82 Bus. Elec. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that agreements must be strictly anti-competitive) cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988).
83 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 56 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
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Court will only declare a practice to be per se illegal after it has
significant experience with the practice. 4
B. Case Law Concerning Vertical Restraints on Trade
1. The Beginning - The Dr. Miles Per Se Rule Against
Resale PriceMaintenance and its Exceptions
In Dr. Miles,85 the Dr. Miles Medical Company manufactured
and sold proprietary medicines.8 6 The Dr. Miles Company had a
carefully devised system by which it sought to "maintain certain
prices fixed by it for all sales of its products both at wholesale and
retail."87 In order to accomplish its goals, it limited trade in its
products to those who became parties to one of two restrictive
agreements, either the "Consignment Contract - Wholesale" or the
"Retail Agency Contract."88 The defendant, John D. Park & Sons
Co., refused to enter into either of the restrictive agreements. The
defendant then obtained Dr. Miles's products by inducing other
companies, who were part of the agreements, to break the terms of
the agreements and sell to it.89 Dr. Miles sued them for interfering
with the contracts.9" The main issue on appeal to the Supreme
Court was whether the agreements that the defendant had
interfered with were valid.9'
Dr. Miles argued that the contracts created consignment and
agency relationships with the other parties to the contract. 92 The
Court found that under both agreements, the other parties were
neither consignees93 nor agents,9" but rather "contemplated
84 Broad. Music v. Columbia Recording Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (citing U.S. v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)) (noting that
the Court requires considerable experience with certain business relationships to declare
a specific practice per se illegal).
85 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 373.
86 Id. at 394.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.

90 Id.

91Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 395.
92 Id.
93

Id. at 396-97.

94 Id.at 398.
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purchasers who buy to sell again, that is, retail dealers. 95
The Court relied on three rationales to justify its decision.
The first was the common law rule against general restraints on
alienation: "The right of alienation is one of the essential
incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints
on alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public
policy, which is best served by great freedom of traffic in such
things as pass from hand to hand., 96 Another rationale was that
vertical restraints were similar to horizontal restraints, which were
illegal per se : "The complainant can fair no better with its plan of
identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with
each other." 97 The third rationale was what might be called the
free market justification: "The complainant having sold its
product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to
whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the
subsequent traffic."98 The Court never conducted any economic
analysis of vertical restraints. 99 The Court held the agreements
were not valid and declared that vertical price restraints were
illegal per se ."'
In the next fifteen years, the Court created two significant
exceptions to the per se rule of Dr. Miles, the Colgate and
General Electric exceptions. In United States v. Colgate,1"1
Colgate announced to its customer resellers that they could not sell
particular products below certain prices." 2 It investigated to see if
dealers were selling below the prices, sought assurances from
dealers who did that they would forgo the practice, and terminated
dealers who would not comply.0 3 The Court held that the
Sherman Act did not prohibit Colgate's conduct. The Court said,
95 Id.
97

Id. at 404 (citing John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (1907)).
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.

98

Id. at 409.

96

99 See id.
100 Id.
1l01Colgate, 250 U.S. 300.
102 Id. at 303.
103 Id.
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"[t]he trader or manufacturer . ..carries on an entirely private
business and can sell to whom he pleases."'' 4 Moreover, in United
States v. GeneralElectric Co., °5 General Electric sold products to
resellers on a consignment basis."0 6 It mandated that the products
not be sold for less thana certain price.'07
The Court held that this
08
Act.1
Sherman
the
of
violation
a
not
was
The Colgate rule and the General Electric rule were later
significantly limited. In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,109
Parke Davis announced its resale prices and refused to deal with
resellers who would not agree to abide by the prices."0 When
several dealers objected to the resale price policy, Parke Davis
terminated them."' The Court held that they were in violation of
the Sherman Act," 2 and that any firm that did more than announce
a suggested resale price and refuse to deal with those which would
not comply with it would violate the Sherman Act." 3 In Simpson
v. Union Oil Co. of California,1"' the Court limited the General
Electric rule. It held that while selling goods on a consignment
basis was not itself a violation of the Sherman Act; it would be a
violation if the manufacturer mandated a minimum resale price." 5
The Court also created a partial exception for vertical nonprice restraints in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. 116 In that
case, Schwinn sold bicycles two ways: On a consignment basis
and on a basis where title passed to the reseller." 7 It mandated
territories in which its dealers could sell." 8 The Court held that
Id.at 307.
105 220 U.S. 476 (1926).
106 See id at 478-79.
107 See id at 481-84.
108 Id.at 488.
109 U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appeal
after remand, 365 U.S. 125 (1961).
110 Id.at33.
1H Id.at34.
112 Id.at49.
113 Id. at 44.
104

114 377 U.S. 13,24 (1964).
''5 Id.
116 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
117 Id. at 370.
118 Id. at 371.
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the non-price vertical restraints at issue in the case were a
violation of the Sherman Act when title passed to the reseller, 1 9
but not120when the goods were sold to the reseller on a consignment
basis.
There was also a legislatively created exception to the per se
ban on resale price maintenance, which allowed the practice to be
legal in individual states from 1937 until 1975.121 During that
time, pursuant to the Miller-Tydings Act, 122 states could pass "fair
trade" laws that would allow for minimum resale price24
23 Thirty-six states passed such laws.1
maintenance in their state.
However, Congress, with the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
1975,125 repealed the Miller-Tydings Act, and the Supreme Court
the
ruled that the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act had re-instituted
26
Sherman Act's complete ban on resale price maintenance. 1
2. Albrecht, Khan and Maximum Resale Price
Maintenance
The Court has also dealt with restrictions fixing maximum
In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 127 Herald published a
prices.
newspaper, the Globe-Democrat, circulated in St. Louis,
It distributed the paper by contracting with
Missouri. 28
independent retailers, who "[bought] papers at wholesale and
[resold] them at retail."'' 29 The retailers had exclusive areas, which
would be terminated if they charged a price higher than the
paper's suggested resale price. 30 Albrecht, one of the distributors,
charged a price higher than the suggested resale price.31 The
119 Id. at 382.
120

Id. at 380.

121 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2727.
122 Act of Aug. 17, 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, repealed by Consumer Goods

Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801.
123 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2727.
124 Id.
125 Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
126 See California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
127 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
128 Id.at 147.
129 Id.

130 Id.
131 Id.
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Herald, after objecting to Albrecht's conduct, engaged Milne
Circulation Sales Inc. to solicit customers to receive the paper
directly from the Herald for the lower price-about 300 customers
switched. 32 Herald then informed Albrecht that he could have his
1 33
route back if he agreed to abide by the price restrictions.
Albrecht refused and filed suit in 34federal court, alleging a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1
The Court agreed with Albrecht, holding that "agreements to
fix maximum prices, 'no less than those to fix minimum prices,
cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to
sell in accordance with their own judgment."", 135 The Court went
on to state "schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the
perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the
competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of
buyers to compete and survive in that market.' ' 136 Buyers could be
prejudiced by dealers not being able to provide enough services
which consumers desire and will pay for; and this might channel
distribution into a few large and "specifically advantaged
1 37
firms."'
The Court also rejected the argument that maximum
prices were necessary because they granted exclusive areas to
distributors, and fixing maximum prices would prevent
distributors from engaging in a monopoly. Thus, if that was the
only way to protect against monopoly, then the whole scheme
38
would be invalid.
Several decades later, the Court dealt with maximum price
restrictions again. In State Oil Co. v. Barkat U. Khan and Khan,
& Assoc., Inc.,' 139 Khan entered into a contract with State Oil "to
132

Id.

133 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 148.
134 Id.

135 Id.at 152 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S.
211,213 (1950)).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 152-53.

Id. at 153-54. The petitioner's argument was that it needed to use one
objectionable practice to curb the effects of its using another objectionable practice. Id.
Thus, if "the economic impact of territorial exclusivity was such that the public could
only be protected by otherwise illegal price fixing itself injurious to the public, the entire
scheme must fail under section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 154.
139 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
138
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lease and operate a gas station and convenience store owned by
State Oil. ' 140 Under the agreement, if Khan sold gasoline at a
price above that suggested by State Oil, any excess profit would
State Oil for a violation of the
go to State Oil. 141 Khan sued
1 42
Sherman Act under Albrecht.
The Court allowed State Oil's practice and overturned
Albrecht,143 citing numerous reasons. One reason relied on by the
Court was the importance and desirability of low prices: "Low
prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set,
and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not
threaten competition.",144 The Court rejected the argument from
Albrecht that maximum price fixing interfered with dealer
"[T]he ban on maximum resale price limitations
freedom:
declared in Albrecht in the name of 'dealer freedom' has actually
prompted many suppliers to integrate forward into distribution,
thus eliminating the very independent trader for whom Albrecht
The Court also rejected Albrecht's
professed solicitude." 145
rationale that the price may be too low for the distributor to offer
needed or desired services to the customer.1 46 The Court did so on
the grounds that such conduct would harm the manufacturer as
well and would thus be unlikely to occur.1 47 Additionally, the
Court noted that the Albrecht Court's concern about distribution
by a large, specially advantaged retailer was unlikely to occur and
not be harmed if inefficient retailers were
consumers would
48
1
disadvantaged.

142

Id. at 7-8.
Id.at 8.
Id.

143

Id. at 22.

140
141

144 Id. at 15 (quoting At. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340

(1990)).
145

Khan, 522 U.S. at 16 (citing 7 PHILLIP

(1989)).
146

Id. at 17.

147

Id.

148

Id.
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3. Business Electronics,BroadcastMusic, GTE
Sylvania, and Monsanto - The Court Relaxes the
Rules Against Vertical Restraints
In Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics149 the issue was
whether "a vertical restraint is per se illegal ... only if there is an

' 50
express or implied agreement to set resale prices at some level."'
Respondent, Sharp Electronic Corporation, sent out a list of
suggested minimum resale prices but did not oblige its dealers to
abide by them. 5 ' Petitioner, Business Electronics, sold calculators
at lower prices and with less services than a competitor. 52 The
competitor felt that the petitioner was free riding on competitor's
services.' 53 The competitor eventually issued an ultimatum to
respondent that he would quit distributing its products if it did not
54
drop petitioner as a retailer.
The respondent obliged and
55

terminated the relationship. 1

The Court held that the respondent's behavior was not a
violation of the Sherman Act. 56 In doing so, it relied on
Continental T. V.Inc., v. GTE
Sylvania Inc. 57 and Monsanto Co. v.
58

Spray-Rite Service Corp.:1

[T]here is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason
standard; that departure from the standard must be
justified by demonstrable economic effect, such as
the facilitation of cartelizing, rather than formalistic
distinctions; that inter brand competition is the
primary concern of the antitrust laws; and that rules
in this area should be formulated with a view
59
towards protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania.
149 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
150 Id.at 720.
151Id.at 721.
152

Id.

153Id.
154Id.
155Business Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 721.
156 Id. at 735-36.
'57 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
158 465 U.S. 752 (1984).

159 Business Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 726.

2009

VERTICAL PRICE RESTRAINTS

The Court noted that the practice at issue in the case did not
always lead to cartelization. 6 ° Specifically it noted that cartels are
extremely difficult to form,16 ' that abuse of superior market power
is not a big problem because not many firms have it, and that other
retailers should have to prove the presence of inter-brand
competition rather than the court assuming it. 16 2

The Court

rejected a formalistic approach, saying that it could not invalidate
all vertical restraints that included the word price.'63 It also noted
that all vertical restraints could be used to increase price, but more
often these 'restraints simply ensure that dealers are providing
adequate services and discouraging free riders."6 The Court also
rejected the argument that a per se rule was justified because
allowing the conduct would almost always involve setting
minimum prices."' It held that it was highly likely that the
practice would be used for a legal reason, like encouraging the
provision of services.' 66
Monsanto v. Spray-Rite'67 involved "a question as to the
standard of proof required to find a vertical price-fixing
16
conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 1
Monsanto had several criteria, such as retaining knowledgeable
salesmen, which it wished its dealers would follow. 169 Monsanto

terminated its contract with Spray-Rite after competing dealers
complained that Spray-Rite had not met those criteria. 7 ' SprayRite alleged that there had been a price-fixing conspiracy in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 7' The district court
found a price-fixing conspiracy, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
160
161

Id. at 726-27.
Id. at 727.

162 Id. at 727 n.2.

728.
Id.
165 Business Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 731.
166 ld.
167 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
168 Id.at 755.
163 Id. at
164

169 Id. at 757.

170 Id.at 757.
171 Id.
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holding that the proper standard of proof was that "proof of
termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to
support an inference of concerted action." '
The Court began its opinion by noting the difference between
unilateral action and concerted action, and the difference between
price and non-price vertical restrictions.'73 The Court held that
there must be more evidence than complaints by competitors, or
evidence of termination in response to complaints. 74 There must
be "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
manufacturer and the non-terminated distributors were acting
independently" to establish liability.' 75 The evidence must show
that the distributor and the manufacturer "had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
'
unlawful objective."176
The reasons for the Court's holding were that it is very
difficult to distinguish between unilateral and concerted action,
and between price and non-price restraints. 77 There are many
legitimate reasons that a manufacturer would be in contact with a
distributor and would be concerned about resale prices. 78 When a
manufacturer wants to further a particular marketing strategy by
means of non-price vertical restraints, which were legal at the
time, it would be in contact with its retailers to make sure that it
made sufficient margins to be able to provide certain services and
to eliminate free riders.179 The same would be true if it were
172 Id. at 758 (quoting Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226,
1238 (1982)). The Appellate Court also characterized it as "proof of distributorship
termination in response to competing distributor's complaints about the terminated
distributor's pricing policies is sufficient to raise an inference of concerted action." Id. at
758 n.4. This standard is different because it implies that the termination was the result
of the complaint, but the distinction did not make a difference in the Court's opinion. Id.
at 759.
173 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761. The Court noted that it was unable to consider the
contention urged by some amici that there was little difference between price and nonprice vertical restraints, and that both should accordingly be treated under rule of reason
analysis as the issue was not before the court. Id. at 761 n.7.
174 Id. at 764.
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, 637 F.2d 105, 111 (1980)).
177 Id. at 762.
178 Id. at 763.
179 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763.
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engaging in unilateral conduct allowed by the Colgate doctrine. 8 °
Indeed, any time that a manufacturer seeks to have its dealers
provide certain services, it is likely that it will hear complaints
about price. This conduct is legitimate and should not be
discouraged. 8 ' However, since it is so close to conduct that is
illegal, if the low evidentiary standard used by the Court of
Appeals was maintained, then much legal and desirable conduct
will be deterred.'82 The Court also noted that distributors are a
good source of information for manufacturers, and it would be
undesirable to prevent a manufacturer from acting just because it
got the information from a distributor.'83
In Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System,'84
Broadcast Music and their codefendants, the American Society of
Composers and Producers (ASCAP), issued blanket licenses to
copyrighted musical compositions to television and radio stations
that wanted to use music to which members held copyrights.' 85 A
station thus paid a fee to use copyrighted material, rather than
paying the group for rights to individual pieces or negotiating with
individual artists or producers. Columbia Broadcasting System
alleged that this amounted to price fixing
and was thus illegal per
86
se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court said that the licenses were price fixing schemes "in
the most literal sense."' 87 However, the Court held that although
the defendants were price fixing, there was no "per se price
fixing."' 88 The Supreme Court, in holding the conduct to be price
' 89
fixing, felt that the Court of Appeals had been "too literal."'
Nevertheless the Court examined the beneficial aspects of the
agreement and held that, because there was so much good to be
had, and while the defendant's conduct was price fixing, it was not
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.at 762-63.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 763-64.
441 U.S. I (1979).
Id.at 4.
Id.at 6.
Maricopa County Med Soc 'y,
457 U.S. at 363.
Broad.Music, 441 U.S. at 8-9.
Id.
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an antitrust violation.'90
In Continentalv. GTE Sylvania, the issue was the appropriate
analysis of "agreements between manufacturers and retailers...
barring the retailers from selling franchised products from
locations other than those specified in the agreements."'1 9'
Sylvania adopted a marketing plan whereby it "phased out its
wholesaler distributors and began to sell to a smaller and more
select group of retailers."' 92 The goal was to attract "the more
'
Sylvania limited the
aggressive and competent retailers."193
number of franchises in a given area and allowed franchisees only
to sell Sylvania products at the store that held the franchise. 94 "A
franchise did not constitute an exclusive territory, and Sylvania
retained sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in an
area in light of the success or failure of existing retailers in
developing their market."1' 95 The strategy was successful and
allowed Sylvania to more than double its share of the color
television market.1 96 The Court also noted that inter-brand
competition, is the primary
competition, as opposed to intra-brand
97
interest of the antitrust laws. 1
The Court acknowledged that vertical restraints are difficult to
analyze because they can, at the same time, both lower intra-brand
competition and increase inter-brand competition. 98 It noted that
in Schwinn, apparently the dichotomy in sale and non-sale
transactions originated in the view that sales transactions were so
destructive of intra-brand competition that per se illegality was
warranted, whereas non-sale transactions were so beneficial to
inter-brand competition that they would merit rule of reason
190 Id. at 19-21. It may seem odd to discuss Broadcast Music in the context of
vertical restraints when the conduct in that case was horizontal. However, Broadcast
Music is important in that it is one of the most representative examples of the shift in the
Court's thinking away from condemning conduct based on formalistic categories and
towards more economic analysis of challenged practices.
191 433 U.S. at 37.
192 Id. at 38.
193 Id.
194 Id.

195 Id.
196 Id.

197 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
198 Id. at 52-53
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analysis. 9 9 It then condemned Schwinn as drawing arbitrary lines,
reiterating that the concern of the antitrust laws was the economic
effect rather than formalism. Among the benefits of vertical nonprice restraints that the Court recognized were that new
manufacturers could use them to break into the market by
"induc[ing] competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of
investment in capital and labor that is often required in the
20
distribution of products unknown to the consumer., 1
Additionally, for larger, more established firms, vertical restraints
can be used "to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities
or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient
marketing of their products" by eliminating the free rider
problem.2 ' The Court also noted that with respect to resale price,
manufacturers, like consumers, would be interested in keeping2 2the
prices low in order to increase sales volume and hence profits.
IV. Analysis
A. Leegin is Consistent With Modern Supreme Court
Antitrust Jurisprudence
Leegin is the natural outgrowth of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence of the last thirty years, if not its whole history. It is
true that resale price maintenance has been per se illegal for
ninety-six years. However, after Colgate and General Electric,
firms could engage in resale price maintenance in all but name. It
was not until the 1960s, when Colgate was narrowed nearly to the
point of elimination by Parke Davis, General Electric, and
Simpson that it became difficult for firms to engage in resale price
maintenance.
In the 1960s, firms' freedom to engage not only in vertical
price maintenance, but also in vertical restraints in general,
became severely limited. We have already seen how vertical price
maintenance was virtually eliminated by Parke Davis. Maximum
resale price maintenance was eliminated by Albrecht.23 Schwinn
199 Id. at 53.

Id.at 55.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 56 n.24.
203 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 68.
200
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virtually eliminated vertical non-price restraints.
However, the Court's views began to change with GTE
Sylvania. Here, the court recognized the virtues of vertical
restraints. 0 4 It recognized that vertical restraints may be used by
manufacturers to encourage distributors to introduce new products,
engage in promotional activities, hire knowledgeable staff, and
provide service and repair.20 5 It also recognized the importance of
vertical restraints in counteracting the free rider effect.0 6
Moreover, it also recognized that inter-brand, rather than intrabrand, competition was the primary focus of antitrust law.2 °7
After GTE Sylvania, firms were again allowed to use vertical
restraints, and the court had recognized all of the arguments for
vertical restraints that were relied on in Leegin. It is surprising
that it took the Court thirty years to get from GTE Sylvania to
Leegin. After GTE Sylvania, it was only a matter of time until the
Court overruled Dr. Miles as Justice White recognized in his
concurring opinion in GTE Sylvania.2 °8
After GTE Sylvania, the Court chose to value formalism over
economic analysis and upheld the use of the per se rule for a case
involving resale price maintenance in 1980. It allowed vertical
non-price restraints. This allowance is interesting because there is
virtually no difference between vertical price restraints and
vertical non-price restraints. 20 9 Any vertical restraint will raise
prices; the only question is how.2 10 Vertical price and non-price
restraints are used for exactly the same reasons-that is, to get the
dealer to provide extra services and to avoid the free-rider
effect.2 1 '
What is even more interesting is that the Court knew of this
204 Id. at 54-55 ("Vertical restrictions promote inter-brand competition by allowing
the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.").
205 Id.
206 Id. at 55.
207 Id. at 52 n.19.
208 Id. at 68-71 (White, J., concurring).
209 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 70 n.10 (White, J., concurring) (citing Richard
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 292-93 (1975)).
210 Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 156.
211 Id.
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similarity, or should have known of it, at the time it decided GTE
Sylvania. In a footnote, it declared that the distinction between
vertical price and non-price restraints was still good law.2" 2
However, Justice White, in his concurrence, showed that the
reasoning of the majority could hardly be reconciled with that
distinction." 3 As Justice White pointed out, the Court cited an
article by then Professor Richard Posner five times,2 14 which
stated, "I believe that the law should treat price and non-price
restrictions the same and that it should make no distinction
between the imposition of restrictions
in a sale contract and their
2 15
imposition in an agency contract.'
With Monsanto, it became even more odd that vertical price
restraints were not allowed. Monsanto raised the standard of proof
required to establish that a price fixing conspiracy existed. 216 The
main reason for doing this was because the possible procompetitive effects of other types of vertical restriction were so
important that the court did not want to discourage them.217 With
the types of conduct that the Court said were permissible, in
conjunction with the Colgate doctrine, the Court all but winked its
eye at firms as it reiterated that resale price maintenance was
illegal. 218 The Court also emphasized that it could not consider its
legality at the time because the issue was not before the Court.21 9
Perhaps the most egregious example of the Court's formalism
is the case of Broadcast Music. In Broadcast Music, the
212 See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. Vertical price restraints eliminate price

competition among sellers of competing brands and can be used to facilitate cartelizing.
However, non-price restraints reduce price competition, and the fact that they sometimes
have an anti-competitive effect is not enough to justify a per se rule, as the court
repeatedly noted with its reliance on Northern Pacific Railroad. See id. at 57-59.

213 "1 suspect that this purported distinction may be as difficult to justify as that of
Schwinn under the terms of the majority's analysis .... The effect, if not the intention,
of the Court's opinion is necessarily to call into question the firmly established rule
against price restraints." Id.at 70 (White, J., concurring).
214 Id
215 Id. at 70 (White, J.,concurring) (quoting Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy and
the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and
PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975)).
216 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-70.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 761 n.7.
219 Id.
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challenged practice involved price fixing "in the most literal
sense." 220 However, the Court allowed it because of its procompetitive effects 22' or simply employing the rule of reason to
decide a case.
With Leegin, the Court's jurisprudence finally became
coherent. The empty formalism of allowing every sort of vertical
restraint but maintaining resale price maintenance was abandoned.
After Leegin, all vertical restraints would be judged under the rule
of reason. The Court had been on its way to this point ever since
GTE Sylvania. It is also notable that Leegin, like the cases since
GTE Sylvania, focused heavily on economic reasoning in its
analysis.222
B. Leegin and Antitrust Values
Throughout the history of antitrust law, there has been debate
over what the goals or values of antitrust law should be. In the
past the Court has recognized the importance of small businesses.
Thus, in Chicago Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United
States,223 the Court offered the following as one of its justifications
for allowing the Board of Trade to fix prices in certain situations:
It increased the number of country dealers engaging in this branch
of business; supplied them more regularly with bids from Chicago;
and also increased the number of bids received by them from
competing market.224
The high point of small business
protectionism came in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,225 a

merger case, with the Court stating that Congress enacted the
Sherman Act because it "was desirous of preventing the formation
of further oligopolies with their attendant adverse effect upon local
control of industry and upon small business., 226 We can even see
this sentiment to protect small businesses when the Court says that
certain vertical restraints might be acceptable for newer, smaller
firms trying to break into a market but not for more established
220 Maricopa County Med. Soc 'y, 457 U.S. at 363 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221 Id.

222 See discussion supra Part 11(C).
223 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
224 Id. at 240.

225 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
226 Id. at 333.
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The Court has also recognized the free market principle. The
Court in Dr. Miles mentions this principle when it says that once a
manufacturer sells its product, it is then up to the retailer what to
do with the product.228 In other cases, such as Albrecht, the Court
discusses the free market principle; the Court worried that
allowing price ceilings would substitute the judgment of the
manufacturer for the judgment of the market. 9 If the retailer
believes that a lower price will best suit its interests, then it should
be able to charge a lower price. Likewise if a higher price will
best suit its interests, then it should be able to charge a higher
price. The free market principle would condemn any interference
with the judgment of the retailer.23 °
The Court had been moving away from the idea of small
business protectionism for some time. 23 ' Leegin considered the
argument for small business protectionism and came down against
it.2 32 It mentions expressly that protection of small, inefficient
retailers is not the goal of antitrust-the goal of antitrust is
protecting competition.233 Nevertheless, it is ironic that while
disavowing the protection of small business, the Court's holding is
likely to protect small business. Resale price maintenance, like
other vertical restraints, allows smaller, inefficient retailers to stay
in business in some cases. Also, resale price maintenance
(allegedly) 234 helps new firms break into the market by ensuring
wide margins on risky products. 35 Moreover, there is evidence to
suggest that when resale price maintenance was illegal, many
larger firms simply chose to vertically integrate,236 thereby driving

227 See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55.
228 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409.
229 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53.
230 See, e.g., id.

See, e.g., At. Richfield v. U.S. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (stating that antitrust laws
were intended for "the protection of competition, not competitors").
232 See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2724.
231

233 Id.

234 See discussion infra Part IV(C) (expressing skepticism as to this idea).
235 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 184-85.

236 That is, to distribute their products themselves.
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smaller firms out of business.237
The Court failed to discuss the third rationale relied on in Dr.
Miles-that of the free market. Allowing resale price maintenance
has a faintly anti-free market feel to it. As discussed in the
preceding paragraph, it will aid smaller, more inefficient firms.
The free riders that are condemned by the cases used to be
"regarded as the very heart of a free market competitive
'
system."238
And it should be pointed out that if manufacturers so
desperately desire that certain services be provided with their
products, they should just contract separately for them.239
There is a free market argument for allowing vertical price
restraints. By allowing resale price maintenance, we are
promoting the freedom of the manufacturer.24 If the manufacturer
wished, it could simply vertically integrate.241 Judge (later Chief
Justice) Taft recognized this long ago in his opinion in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 242 In discussing the case of
Chicago, St. Louis & N.O.R. Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co.,243 a
case involving a sleeping-car company providing sleeping-cars to
a railroad, in return for the promise that no other sleeping-car
company would be allowed to operate on the same rail line, Judge
Taft explained the utility of certain vertical restraints on trade:
The main purpose of such a contract is to furnish
sleeping-car facilities to the public. The railroad
company may discharge this duty itself to the public
and allow no one else to do it; or it may hire
someone to do it, and, to secure the necessary
investment of capital in the discharge of the duty,
may secure to the sleeping-car company the same
freedom from competition that it would have itself
237 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 33.
238 Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se

Rule Against VerticalPrice Fixing, 71 GEO. L. J. 1487, 1493 (1983).
239 Id.
240 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
289 (The Free Press, 10th ed. 1993).
241 See id.
242 Id.(citing U.S. v. Addyson Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 287 (6th Cir. 1898)).
243 139 U.S. 79 (1891).
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in discharging the duty. The restraint upon itself is
properly proportioned to, and is only ancillary to,
the main purpose of the contract which is to secure
proper facilities to the public.2"
It is in this manner that manufacturers' resale price
maintenance gives manufacturers a choice between vertically
integrating and hiring separate firms to distribute its products on
terms that the firms find acceptable.
C. Analysis of Some of the Court'sEconomic Reasoning
One of the Leegin Court's rationales for allowing vertical
price restraints is that it stimulates inter-brand competition.245 It
does this by decreasing competition among the resellers of one
brand, allowing that brand to compete with other brands.246 Some
have criticized this argument on the grounds that when the
services are added to the product, it becomes a new product, and
thus decreases inter-brand competition.2 47 However, as the Court
recognized in GTE Sylvania, albeit in relation to another type of
vertical restraint, "[t]his argument is flawed by its necessary
assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting
from vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable
information about product availability, price, quality, and
services. '
Another justification is that resale price maintenance
encourages retailers to provide extra services and counteracts the
free rider effect.24 9 This justification will only apply to items for

which more information would actually be helpful. There are
many cases, like those involving products that differ little from
competing brands and are sold side by side, such as goods in a
supermarket, where this justification would be unfounded.
244 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. at 287.
245 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715.
246

Id.

247 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56 n.25 (citing William S. Comanor, Vertical

Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White Motor andIts Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1419, 1422 (1968)).
248 Id.
249 HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 184.
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Criticism of this rationale also states that rational buyers who are
likely to derive "consumer surplus" from the product are likely
well informed anyway; it is only those who are indifferent to
purchasing the product that might be influenced by pre-sale
services. 5° However, the same objection could be made to
advertising; presumably the manufacturer knows its own best
interests.
The Court also justifies vertical price restraints by
acknowledging that resale price maintenance facilitates market
entry for new firms.25 The idea is that when a firm wishes to
enter a market, it can guarantee retailers a sufficient margin to
engage in necessary promotional activities.252 However, if a
retailer was unsure about a new product, it is hard to see how
forcing it to sell at a certain price would allay its skepticism.
A criticism of resale price maintenance is that it is often used
to form cartels, either at the retailer or at the manufacturer level.253
However, this is not likely to be a problem because cartels rarely
use vertical price maintenance. 4 At the retailer level, a cartel
would be inefficient because it would not restrain sellers of other
similar products. 255 Also, even if the retailers did use resale price
maintenance to enforce a cartel, it would be easy for enforcement
authorities to detect. 256 As for manufacturers, "the difficulty of
negotiating agreeable price differentials among all the retailers and
manufacturers," and the proliferation and diversity of high volume
discount marketers make resale price maintenance almost
impossible as a method of enforcing a manufacturer cartel.257
Manufacturers have other ways to police cartels.258 Resale
price maintenance would also be inefficient for manufacturers
Brief for William S. Comanor and Frederic M. Scherer as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 5, Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480) (hereinafter "Comanor and Scherer").
251 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2716.
250

252 Id.
253
254
255

Id.at 2717 (2007) (quoting Bus. Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 725).
Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 135.
BoRK, supra note 240, at 292.

256 Id
257 Id.
258

Id.at 292-93.
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since their dealers have differing costs of operation, and this
inefficiency for the retailers will result in lost profits to the
manufacturer.2 59 Even if a cartel used resale price maintenance,
there would still be an incentive to cheat because the lower price
26 °
could be used by the retailer to give more services.
Additionally, as with a retailer cartel, it would be easy for
enforcement authorities to detect a manufacturer cartel that is
using resale price maintenance in an anti-competitive way.261
The Court also worried that a dominant retailer could use
resale price maintenance to forestall innovation or to encourage
retailers not to sell the products of a competitor. 262 As to the first
concern, a dominant retailer might ask for resale price
maintenance from a manufacturer in order to keep other retailers
from developing new cost-saving methods of innovation.2 63 The
second concern might arise when a manufacturer requires its
products to be sold at a price that would allow the retailer to
realize higher profit margins than it would be able to by selling the
products of the manufacturer's competitor. 264 However, neither
concern is likely to be a problem, because market power is
extremely rare. 265
It iis important to note that markets are
Id. at 293.
Id.
261 BORK, supra note 240, at 294.
262 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717.
263 An example might be helpful. Say firm A, a retailer of widgets, is dominant in
the widget retail market. Finn A competes with several other finns, including firm B.
Finn B develops a new distribution method that allows it to sell widgets at a lower price
than firm A. Firm A subsequently uses its dominant power in the retail market to force
firms X, Y and Z, the leading manufacturers of widgets, to insert a provision fixing a
minimum resale price into all future widget contracts. Firm B is now disabled from
passing along savings realized by its new distribution method to consumers, and firm A
is now "saved" from having to innovate.
264 Once again, an example may be helpful. Say firm A is a dominant manufacturer
of widgets but faces a small amount of competition from firms B and C. Firms X, Y and
Z are retailers of widgets. A widget costs a retailer one dollar. After various other costs
are included, firms X, Y and Z are able to sell widgets at a price of two dollars, thereby
realizing a profit of one dollar per widget. Firm A inserts a provision into its contracts
requiring that widgets be sold at three dollars, allowing vendors of widgets to realize a
profit of two dollars per widget. Assuming firm A is a dominant manufacturer in the
relevant product and geographic markets, retailers will thus be encouraged to sell
widgets manufactured by firm A, because they are able to realize a larger profit on them.
265 Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 142-43.
259

260
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becoming more concentrated, so this may become a problem in the
future.266
The dissent asserts that resale price maintenance will cause
prices to rise.267 Indeed, when resale price maintenance was legal
under the state fair trade laws before 1975, prices were higher on
items for which resale price maintenance was used.26 However,
this objection is somewhat circular-if manufacturers mandate a
higher minimum price, of course prices will go up, as that is the
whole point of resale price maintenance. Here, prices only rose on
items for which resale price maintenance was used. As Frank H.
Easterbrook pointed out, "U]ust why K-Mart's existence is
threatened if it can't sell shirts with little crocodile emblems has
never been
explained. There are lots of other knit shirts in the
9
world.

26

D. Leegin as Precedent
The Court lists several factors that may play into a future rule
of reason analysis, including "the number of manufacturers that
make use of the practice in a given industry," the source of the
restraint, and the market power of the firm engaged in the
restraint. 27"
Given the reasons for and against resale price
maintenance, these factors seem logical and well considered.
When examining the number of manufacturers, the Court
does not go far enough in its analysis. The Court states that resale
price maintenance will only be a problem if the practice is
widespread.27 ' However, the practice would have to be not only
widespread but also uniform.272 If the practice is not uniform, then
a dealer wishing to sell at lower prices can simply buy from a
manufacturer that does not impose resale price maintenance.273
The Court also stated that the source of the restraint is

266 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

267 Id.
at 2727-28 (2007).
268 Id. at 2728.
269 Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 152.
270 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719-20.
271 Id. at 2719.
272 Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 162-63.
273

Id.
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important 274 There is simply no legitimate reason for a dealer to
271
pressure a manufacturer into imposing resale price maintenance.
Indeed, when resale price
This is not a small concern.
maintenance was legal under the state fair trade laws, one of the
biggest supporters of resale price maintenance were retail
druggists, who conspired to have manufacturers or legislatures
impose resale price maintenance laws on them.2 76 When the state
fair trade laws were repealed in 1975, average profit margins for
retail druggists declined from forty percent to twenty percent.277
The Court also recognized that market power would also be a
useful consideration.2 78 This will not normally be a concern, as
most firms lack the necessary market power to engage in such
behavior. 279 As markets become more concentrated, this could
become a very important consideration. For example, among
retailers, though the top five food retail outfits in the country
controlled less than twenty percent of the market for years, from
1997-2000 the top five increased their collective market share
On the
from twenty-four percent to forty-two percent.280
manufacturer side, for instance, "[t]he top eight manufacturers of
household laundry equipment" accounted for ninety percent of the
market in 1958, compared with ninety-nine percent in 2002.281
V. Conclusion
Leegin correctly overturned the poorly reasoned Dr. Miles
decision. Moreover, it is in accord with the Court's recent
antitrust jurisprudence. Since the GTE Sylvania decision, the
trend has been toward liberalization in the area of vertical
restraints. The Court has allowed other vertical restraints, which
have the same uses and effects as resale price maintenance. If the
Court had not overruled Dr. Miles, it would have been an exercise
in arbitrary line drawing divorced from economic reasoning.
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719.
Comanor and Scherer, supra note 250, at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720.
Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 159.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
Id. at 2734.
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The Court's standards for a per se rule do not justify
imposing that rule on resale price maintenance. The Court had not
had much experience with resale price maintenance when it
announced its decision in Dr. Miles and failed to look at the effect
of resale price maintenance in that case. It has not had experience
with resale price maintenance since Dr. Miles, since the per se
rule barred the introduction of evidence on economic effect in
litigation involving resale price maintenance.
Resale price
maintenance has both pro-competitive and anti-competitive
effects, and thus is a perfect candidate for the rule of reason.
Some have suggested that resale price maintenance be legal per se
282 However, it would seem wise to wait, as the Court decided to
do, until the Court has more experience in the area in accord with
the Court's policy on per se rules.
The rule may well lead to the increase of prices. When resale
price maintenance was legal under the state fair trade laws, prices
were generally higher than in states that did not allow resale price
maintenance. However, when goods are affected by resale price
maintenance, they become different goods, superior goods, with
more services. As the Court recognized, consumer welfare and
prices are not always the same.2" 3
PETER

282

See Easterbrook, supra note 7 1.

283 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
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